Sam Harris replies.

Among the many quandaries a writer must face after publishing a controversial book is the question of how, or whether, to respond to criticism. At a minimum, it would seem wise to correct misunderstandings and distortions of one's views wherever they appear, but one soon discovers that there is no good way of doing this. After my first book was published, the journalist Chris Hedges seemed to make a career out of misrepresenting its contents -- asserting, among other calumnies, that somewhere in its pages I call for an immediate, nuclear first-strike on the entire Muslim world. Hedges spread this lie so sedulously that I could have spent the next year writing letters to the editor. Even if I had been willing to squander my time in this way, such letters are generally pointless, as few people read them. In the end, I decided to create a page on my website addressing controversies of this kind, so that I can then forget all about them. The result has been less than satisfying. Several years have passed, and I still meet people at public talks and in comment threads who believe that I support the outright murder of hundreds of millions of innocent people.
The problem posed by public criticism is by no means limited to the question of what to do about misrepresentations of one's work. There is simply no good forum in which to respond to reviews of any kind, no matter how substantive. To do so in a separate essay is to risk confusing readers with a litany of disconnected points or -- worse -- boring them to salt. And any author who rises to the defense of his own book is always in danger of looking petulant, vain, and ineffectual. There is a galling asymmetry at work here: to say anything at all in response to criticism is to risk doing one's reputation further harm by appearing to care too much about it.
These strictures now weigh heavily on me, because I recently published a book, The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, which has provoked a backlash in intellectual (and not-so-intellectual) circles. I knew this was coming, given my thesis, but this knowledge left me no better equipped to meet the cloudbursts of vitriol and confusion once they arrived. Watching the tide of opinion turn against me, it has been difficult to know what, if anything, to do about it.
How, for instance, should I respond to the novelist Marilynne Robinson's paranoid, anti-science gabbling in the Wall Street Journal where she consigns me to the company of the lobotomists of the mid 20th century? Better not to try, I think -- beyond observing how difficult it can be to know whether a task is above or beneath you. What about the science writer John Horgan, who was kind enough to review my book twice, once in Scientific American where he tarred me with the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiments, the abuse of the mentally ill, and eugenics, and once in The Globe and Mail, where he added Nazism and Marxism for good measure? How does one graciously respond to non sequiturs? The purpose of The Moral Landscape is to argue that we can, in principle, think about moral truth in the context of science. Robinson and Horgan seem to imagine that the mere existence of the Nazi doctors counts against my thesis. Is it really so difficult to distinguish between a science of morality and the morality of science? To assert that moral truths exist, and can be scientifically understood, is not to say that all (or any) scientists currently understand these truths or that those who do will necessarily conform to them.
But we must descend further before reaching a higher place: for occasionally one's book will be reviewed by a prominent person who has not even taken the trouble to open it. Such behavior is always surprising and, in a strange way, refreshingly stupid. What should I say, for instance, when the inimitable Deepak Chopra produces a long, poisonous, and blundering review of The Moral Landscape in The San Francisco Chronicle while demonstrating in every line that he has not read it? (His "review" is wholly based on a short Q&A I published for promotional purposes on my website.) Admittedly, there is something arresting about being called a scientific fraud and "egotistical" by Chopra. This is rather like being branded an exhibitionist by Lady Gaga. In retrospect, I see that the haste and bile of Chopra's fake review are readily explained: we had recently participated in a debate at Caltech (along with Michael Shermer and Jean Houston) in which the great man had greatly embarrassed himself. And while I am certainly capable of being both scientifically mistaken and egotistical, I am confident that anyone who views our exchange in its entirety will recognize that I am the firefly to Chopra's sun.
Why respond to criticism at all? Many writers refuse to even read their reviews, much less answer them. The problem, however, is that if one is committed to the spread of ideas -- as most nonfiction writers are -- it is hard to ignore the fact that negative reviews can be very damaging to one's cause. Not only do they discourage smart people from reading a book, they can lead them to disparage it as though they had discovered its flaws for themselves. Consider the following published remarks from the philosopher Colin McGinn, whose work I greatly admire:

I think Sam Harris' idea is equally bad [as religion-based morality], I'm surprised he'd write on it. There's just some really bad thinking in Sam Harris's new book, I haven't read it yet, but that's because from what I've heard, it sounds terrible and wrong-headed and just bizarre. He's trying to make science do what religion used to. His basic philosophical reason is a fallacy, it's impossible to derive ought from is, the naturalistic fallacy, it's a complete misconception that you can. I'm surprised Sam Harris would fall for that. A few weeks ago, Anthony Appiah nailed him for it in the New York Times. I have no idea why that arises in some scientists. The idea is wrong. It's been refuted. It's hard to believe they still argue that point.

No matter that I cannot find a single, substantive point in Appiah's review not already addressed in my book, McGinn appears to know otherwise through the power of clairvoyance. Many other philosophers and scientists have begun to play this game with The Moral Landscape, without ever engaging its arguments. And so, mindful of the dangers, I have decided to answer the strongest criticisms that have appeared to date. Failure beckons on both sides, of course, as my response will be all-too-brief for some and far more than others can stomach. But it is worth a try.

As far as I know, the best reviews of The Moral Landscape have come from the philosophers Thomas Nagel, Troy Jollimore, and Russell Blackford. I will focus on Blackford's (along with a few of his subsequent blog posts) as it strikes me as the most searching. It also seems to echo everything of interest in the others.
For those unfamiliar with my book, here is my argument in brief: Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds -- and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe. Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomenon, of course, fully constrained by the laws of Nature (whatever these turn out to be in the end). Therefore, there must be right and wrong answers to questions of morality and values that potentially fall within the purview of science. On this view, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.
Blackford and others worry that any aspect of human subjectivity or culture could fit in the space provided: after all, a preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream is a natural phenomenon, as is a preference for the comic Sarah Silverman over Bob Hope. Are we to imagine that there are universal truths about ice cream and comedy that admit of scientific analysis? Well, in a certain sense, yes. Science could, in principle, account for why some of us prefer chocolate to vanilla, and why no one's favorite flavor of ice cream is aluminum. Comedy must also be susceptible to this kind of study. There will be a fair amount of cultural and generational variation in what counts as funny, but there are probably basic principles of comedy -- like the violation of expectations, the breaking of taboos, etc. -- that could be universal. Amusement to the point of laughter is a specific state of the human nervous system that can be scientifically studied. Why do some people laugh more readily than others? What exactly happens when we "get" a joke? These are ultimately questions about the human brain. There will be scientific facts to be known here, and any differences in taste among human beings must be attributable to other facts that fall within the purview of science. If we were ever to arrive at a complete understanding of the human mind, we would understand human preferences of all kinds. Indeed, we might even be able to change them.
However, morality and values appear to reach deeper than mere matters of taste -- beyond how people happen to think and behave to questions of how they should think and behave. And it is this notion of "should" that introduces a fair amount of confusion into any conversation about moral truth. I should note in passing, however, that I don't think the distinction between morality and something like taste is as clear or as categorical as we might suppose. If, for instance, a preference for chocolate ice cream allowed for the most rewarding experience a human being could have, while a preference for vanilla did not, we would deem it morally important to help people overcome any defect in their sense of taste that caused them to prefer vanilla -- in the same way that we currently treat people for curable forms of blindness. It seems to me that the boundary between mere aesthetics and moral imperative -- the difference between not liking Matisse and not liking the Golden Rule -- is more a matter of there being higher stakes, and consequences that reach into the lives of others, than of there being distinct classes of facts regarding the nature of human experience. There is much more to be said on this point, of course, but it is not one that I covered in my book, so I will pass it by.
Let's begin with my core claim that moral truths exist. In what was a generally supportive review of The Moral Landscape, strewn with strange insults, the philosopher Thomas Nagel endorsed my basic thesis as follows:

Even if this is an exaggeration, Harris has identified a real problem, rooted in the idea that facts are objective and values are subjective. Harris rejects this facile opposition in the only way it can be rejected -- by pointing to evaluative truths so obvious that they need no defense. For example, a world in which everyone was maximally miserable would be worse than a world in which everyone was happy, and it would be wrong to try to move us toward the first world and away from the second. This is not true by definition, but it is obvious, just as it is obvious that elephants are larger than mice. If someone denied the truth of either of those propositions, we would have no reason to take him seriously...

The true culprit behind contemporary professions of moral skepticism is the confused belief that the ground of moral truth must be found in something other than moral values. One can pose this type of question about any kind of truth. What makes it true that 2 + 2 = 4? What makes it true that hens lay eggs? Some things are just true; nothing else makes them true. Moral skepticism is caused by the currently fashionable but unargued assumption that only certain kinds of things, such as physical facts, can be "just true" and that value judgments such as "happiness is better than misery" are not among them. And that assumption in turn leads to the conclusion that a value judgment could be true only if it were made true by something like a physical fact. That, of course, is nonsense.

It is encouraging to see a philosopher of Nagel's talents conceding this much -- for the position he sketches nullifies much of the criticism I have received. However, my view of moral truth demands a little more than this -- not because I am bent upon reducing morality to "physical" facts in any crude sense, but because I can't see how we can keep the notion of moral truth within a walled garden, forever set apart from the truths of science. In my view, morality must be viewed in the context of our growing scientific understanding of the mind. If there are truths to be known about the mind, there will be truths to be known about how minds flourish; consequently, there will be truths to be known about good and evil.
Many critics claim that my reliance on the concept of "well-being" is arbitrary and philosophically indefensible. Who's to say that well-being is important at all or that other things aren't far more important? How, for instance, could you convince someone who does not value well-being that he should, in fact, value it? And even if one could justify well-being as the true foundation for morality, many have argued that one would need a "metric" by which it could be measured -- else there could be no such thing as moral truth in the scientific sense. There seems to be a unnecessarily restrictive notion of science underlying this last claim -- as though scientific truths only exist if we can have immediate and uncontroversial access to them in the lab. The physicist Sean Carroll has written a fair amount against me on this point (again, without having read my book), and he is in the habit of saying things like, "I don't know what a unit of well-being is," as though he were regretfully delivering the killing blow to my thesis. I would venture that Carroll doesn't know what a unit of depression is either -- and units of joy, disgust, boredom, irony, envy, or any other mental state worth studying won't be forthcoming. If half of what Carroll says about the limits of science is true, the sciences of mind are not merely doomed, there would be no facts for them to understand in the first place.
It seems to me that there are three, distinct challenges put forward thus far:
1. There is no scientific basis to say that we should value well-being, our own or anyone else's. (The Value Problem)
2. Hence, if someone does not care about well-being, or cares only about his own and not about the well-being of others, there is no way to argue that he is wrong from the point of view of science. (The Persuasion Problem)
3. Even if we did agree to grant "well-being" primacy in any discussion of morality, it is difficult or impossible to define it with rigor. It is, therefore, impossible to measure well-being scientifically. Thus, there can be no science of morality. (The Measurement Problem)
I believe all of these challenges are the product of philosophical confusion. The simplest way to see this is by analogy to medicine and the mysterious quantity we call "health." Let's swap "morality" for "medicine" and "well-being" for "health" and see how things look:
1. There is no scientific basis to say that we should value health, our own or anyone else's. (The Value Problem)
2. Hence, if someone does not care about health, or cares only about his own and not about the health of others, there is no way to argue that he is wrong from the point of view of science. (The Persuasion Problem)
3. Even if we did agree to grant "health" primacy in any discussion of medicine, it is difficult or impossible to define it with rigor. It is, therefore, impossible to measure health scientifically. Thus, there can be no science of medicine. (The Measurement Problem)
While the analogy may not be perfect, I maintain that it is good enough to obviate these three criticisms. Is there a Value Problem, with respect to health? Is it unscientific to value health and seek to maximize it within the context of medicine? No. Clearly there are scientific truths to be known about health -- and we can fail to know them, to our great detriment. This is a fact. And yet, it is possible for people to deny this fact, or to have perverse and even self-destructive ideas about how to live. Needless to say, it can be fruitless to argue with such people. Does this mean we have a Persuasion Problem with respect to medicine? No. Christian Scientists, homeopaths, voodoo priests, and the legions of the confused don't get to vote on the principles of medicine. "Health" is also hard to define -- and, what is more, the definition keeps changing. There is no clear "metric" by which we can measure it, and there may never be one -- because "health" is a suitcase term for hundreds, if not thousands, of variables. Is an ability to "jump very high" one of them? That depends. What would my doctor think if I wanted a full neurological workup because I can only manage a 30-inch vertical leap? He would think I had lost my mind. However, if I were a professional basketball player who had enjoyed a 40-inch leap every day of his adult life, I would be reporting a sudden, 25 percent decline in my abilities -- not a good sign. Do such contingencies give us a Measurement Problem with respect to health? Do they indicate that medicine will never be a proper science? No. "Health" is a loose concept that may always bend and stretch depending on the context -- but there is no question that both it and its context exist within an underlying reality which we can understand, or fail to understand, with the tools of science.
Let's look at these problems in light of Blackford's review:
The Value Problem
My critics have been especially exercised over the subtitle of my book, "how science can determine human values." The charge is that I haven't actually used science to determine the foundational value (well-being) upon which my proffered science of morality would rest. Rather, I have just assumed that well-being is a value, and this move is both unscientific and question-begging. Here is Blackford:

If we presuppose the well-being of conscious creatures as a fundamental value, much else may fall into place, but that initial presupposition does not come from science. It is not an empirical finding... Harris is highly critical of the claim, associated with Hume, that we cannot derive an "ought" solely from an "is" - without starting with people's actual values and desires. He is, however, no more successful in deriving "ought" from "is" than anyone else has ever been. The whole intellectual system of The Moral Landscape depends on an "ought" being built into its foundations.

Again, the same can be said about medicine, or science as a whole. As I point out in my book, science in based on values that must be presupposed -- like the desire to understand the universe, a respect for evidence and logical coherence, etc. One who doesn't share these values cannot do science. But nor can he attack the presuppositions of science in a way that anyone should find compelling. Scientists need not apologize for presupposing the value of evidence, nor does this presupposition render science unscientific. In my book, I argue that the value of well-being -- specifically the value of avoiding the worst possible misery for everyone -- is on the same footing. There is no problem in presupposing that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and worth avoiding and that normative morality consists, at an absolute minimum, in acting so as to avoid it. To say that the worst possible misery for everyone is "bad" is, on my account, like saying that an argument that contradicts itself is "illogical." Our spade is turned. Anyone who says it isn't simply isn't making sense. The fatal flaw that Blackford claims to have found in my view of morality could just as well be located in science as a whole -- or reason generally. Our "oughts" are built right into the foundations. We need not apologize for pulling ourselves up by our bootstraps in this way. It is far better than pulling ourselves down by them.
Blackford raises another issue with regard to the concept of well-being:

There could be situations where the question of which course of action might maximize well-being has no determinate answer, and not merely because well-being is difficult to measure in practice but because there is some room for rational disagreement about exactly what it is. If it's shorthand for the summation of various even deeper values, there could be room for legitimate disagreement on exactly what these are, and certainly on how they are to be weighted. But if that is so, there could end up being legitimate disagreement on what is to be done, with no answer that is objectively binding on all the disagreeing parties.

Couldn't the same be said about human health? What if there are trade-offs with respect to human performance that we just can't get around -- what if, for instance, an ability to jump high always comes at the cost of flexibility? Will there be disagreements between orthopedists who specialize in basketball and those who specialize in yoga? Sure. So what? We will still be talking about very small deviations from a common standard of "health" -- one which does not include anencephaly or a raging case of smallpox.

[Harris] acknowledges the theoretical possibility that two courses of action, or, say, two different systems of customs and laws could be equal in the amount of well-being that they generate. In such cases, the objectively correct and determinate answer to the question of which is morally better would be: "They are equal." However, he is not prepared to accept a situation where two people who have knowledge of all the facts could legitimately disagree on what ought to be done. The closest they could come to that would be agreement that two (or more) courses of action are equally preferable, so either could be pursued with the same moral legitimacy as the other.

This is not quite true. My model of the moral landscape does allow for multiple peaks -- many different modes of flourishing, admitting of irreconcilable goals. Thus, if you want to move society toward peak 19746X, while I fancy 74397J, we may have disagreements that simply can't be worked out. This is akin to trying to get me to follow you to the summit of Everest while I want to drag you up the slopes of K2. Such disagreements do not land us back in moral relativism, however: because there will be right and wrong ways to move toward one peak or the other; there will be many more low spots on the moral landscape than peaks (i.e. truly wrong answers to moral questions); and for all but the loftiest goals and the most disparate forms of conscious experience, moral disagreements will not be between sides of equal merit. Which is to say that for most moral controversies, we need not agree to disagree; rather, we should do our best to determine which side is actually right.
In any case, I suspect that radically disjoint peaks are unlikely to exist for human beings. We are far too similar to one another to be that different. If we each could sample all possible states of human experience, and were endowed with perfect memories so that we could sort our preferences, I think we would converge on similar judgments of what is good, what is better, and what is best. Differences of opinion might still be possible, and would themselves be explicable in terms of differences at the level of our brains. Consequently, even such disagreements would not be a problem for my account, because to talk about what is truly good, we must also include the possibility (in principle, if not in practice) of changing peoples desires, preferences, and intuitions as a means of moving across the moral landscape. I will discuss the implications of this below.
Generally speaking, I think that the problem of disagreement and indeterminacy that Blackford raises is a product of incomplete information (we will never be able to know all the consequences of an action, estimate all the relevant probabilities, or compare counterfactual states of the world) combined with the inevitable looseness with which certain terms must be defined. Once again, I do not see this as a problem for my view.
The Persuasion Problem
Another concern that prompts Blackford and others to invoke terms like "ought" and "should" is the problem of persuasion. What can I say to persuade another person that he or she should behave differently? What can I think (that is, say to myself) to inspire a change in my own behavior? There are, in fact, people who will not be persuaded by anything I say on the subject of well-being, and who may even claim not to value well-being at all. And even I can knowingly fail to maximize my own well-being by acting in ways that I will later regret, perhaps by forsaking a long term goal in favor of short term pleasure.
The deeper concern, however, is that even if we do agree that well-being is the gold standard by which to measure what is good, people are selfish in ways that we are not inclined to condemn. As Blackford observes:

[W]e usually accept that people act in competition with each other, each seeking the outcome that most benefits them and their loved ones. We don't demand that everyone agree to accept whatever course will maximize the well-being of conscious creatures overall. Nothing like that is part of our ordinary idea of what it is to behave morally.

Why, for example, should I not prefer my own well-being, or the well-being of the people I love, to overall, or global, well-being? If it comes to that, why should I not prefer some other value altogether, such as the emergence of the Ubermensch, to the maximization of global well-being?... Harris never provides a satisfactory response to this line of thought, and I doubt that one is possible. After all, as he acknowledges, the claim that "We should maximize the global well-being of conscious creatures" is not an empirical finding. So what is it? What in the world makes it true? How does it become binding on me if I don't accept it?

The worry is that there is no binding reason to argue that everyone should care about the well-being of others. As Blackford says, when told about the prospect of global well-being, a selfish person can always say, "What is that to me?":

If we want to persuade Alice to take action X, we need to appeal to some value (or desire, or hope, or fear, etc. ... but you get the idea) that she actually has. Perhaps we can appeal to her wish for our approval, but that won't work unless she actually cares about whether or not we approve of her. She is not rationally bound to act in the way we wish her to act, which may be the way that maximizes global welfare, unless we can get some kind of grip on her own actual values and desires (etc.)... Harris does not seem to understand this idea... there are no judgments about how people like Alice should conduct themselves that are binding on them as a matter of fact or reason, irrespective of such things as what they actually value, or desire, or care about... If we are going to provide her with reasons to act in a particular way, or to support a particular policy, or condemn a traditional custom - or whatever it might be - sooner or later we will need to appeal to the values, desires, and so on, that she actually has. There are no values that are, mysteriously, objectively binding on us all in the sense I have been discussing. Thus it is futile to argue from a presupposition that we are all rationally bound to act so as to maximize global well-being. It is simply not the case.

Blackford's analysis of these issues is excellent, of course, but I think it still misses my point. The first thing to notice is that the same doubts can be raised about science/rationality itself. A person can always play the trump card, "What is that to me?" -- and if we don't find it compelling elsewhere, I don't see why it must have special force on questions of good and evil. The more relevant issue, however, is that this notion of "should," with its focus on the burden of persuasion, introduces a false standard for moral truth.
Again, consider the concept of health: should we maximize global health? To my ear, this is a strange question. It invites a timorous reply like, "Provided we want everyone to be healthy, yes." And introducing this note of contingency seems to nudge us from the charmed circle of scientific truth. But why must we frame the matter this way? A world in which global health is maximized would be an objective reality, quite distinct from a world in which we all die early and in agony. Yes, it is true that a person like Alice could seek to maximize her own health without caring about the health of other people -- though her health will depend on the health of others in countless ways (the same, I would argue, is true of her well-being). Is she wrong to be selfish? Would we blame her for taking her own side in any zero-sum contest to secure medicine for herself or for her own children? Again, these aren't the kinds of questions that will get us to bedrock. The truth is, Alice and the rest of us can live so as to allow for a maximally healthy world, or we can fail to do so. Yes, it is possible that a maximally healthy world is one in which Alice is less healthy than she might otherwise be (though this seems unlikely). So what? There is still an objective reality to which our beliefs about human health can correspond. Questions of "should" are not the right lens through which to see this.
And the necessity of grounding moral truth in things that people "actually value, or desire, or care about" also misses the point. People often act against their deeper preferences -- or live in ignorance of what their preferences would be if they had more experience and information. What if we could change Alice's preference themselves? Should we? Obviously we can't answer this question by relying on the very preferences we would change. Contrary to Blackford's assertion, I'm not simply claiming that morality is "fully determined by an objective reality, independent of people's actual values and desires." I am claiming that people's actual values and desires are fully determined by an objective reality, and that we can conceptually get behind all of this -- indeed, we must -- in order to talk about what is actually good. This becomes clear the moment we ask whether it would be good to alter people values and desires.
Consider how we would view a situation in which all of us miraculously began to behave so as to maximize our collective well-being. Imagine that on the basis of remarkable breakthroughs in technology, economics, and politic skill, we create a genuine utopia on earth. Needless to say, this wouldn't be boring, because we will have wisely avoided all the boring utopias. Rather, we will have created a global civilization of astonishing creativity, security, and happiness.
However, some people were not ready for this earthly paradise once it arrived. Some were psychopaths who, despite enjoying the general change in quality of life, were nevertheless eager to break into their neighbors' homes and torture them from time to time. A few had preferences that were incompatible with the flourishing of whole societies: Try as he might, Kim Jong Il just couldn't shake the feeling that his cognac didn't taste as sweet without millions of people starving beyond his palace gates. Given our advances in science, however, we were able to alter preferences of this kind. In fact, we painlessly delivered a firmware update to everyone. Now the entirety of the species is fit to live in a global civilization that is as safe, and as fun, and as interesting, and as filled with love as it can be.
It seems to me that this scenario cuts through the worry that the concept of well-being might leave out something that is worth caring about: for if you care about something that is not compatible with a peak of human flourishing -- given the requisite changes in your brain, you would recognize that you were wrong to care about this thing in the first place. Wrong in what sense? Wrong in the sense that you didn't know what you were missing. This is the core of my argument: I am claiming that there must be frontiers of human well-being that await our discovery -- and certain interests and preferences surely blind us to them.
Nevertheless, Blackford is right to point out that our general approach to morality does not demand that we maximize global well-being. We are selfish to one degree or another; we lack complete information about the consequences of our actions; and even where we possess such information, our interests and preferences often lead us to ignore it. But these facts obscure deeper questions: In what sense can an action be morally good? And what does it mean to make a good action better?
For instance, it seems good for me to buy my daughter a birthday present, all things considered, because this will make both of us happy. Few people would fault me for spending some of my time and money in this way. But what about all the little girls in the world who suffer terribly at this moment for want of resources? Here is where an ethicist like Peter Singer will pounce, arguing that there actually is something morally questionable -- even reprehensible -- about my buying my daughter a birthday present, given my knowledge of how much good my time and money could do elsewhere. What should I do? Singer's argument makes me uncomfortable, but only for a moment. It is simply a fact about me that the suffering of other little girls is often out of sight and out of mind -- and my daughter's birthday is no easier to ignore than an asteroid impact. Can I muster a philosophical defense of my narrow focus? Perhaps. I might be that Singer's case leaves out some important details: what would happen if everyone in the developed world ceased to shop for birthday presents? Wouldn't the best of human civilization just come crashing down upon the worst? How can we spread wealth to the developing world if we do not create wealth in the first place? These reflections, self-serving and otherwise -- along with a thousand other facts about my mind for which Sean Carroll still has no "metric" -- land me in a toy store, looking for something that isn't pink.
So, yes, it is true that my thoughts about global well-being did not amount to much in this instance. And Blackford is right to say that most people wouldn't judge me for it. But what if there were a way for me to buy my daughter a present and also cure another little girl of cancer at no extra cost? Wouldn't this be better than just buying the original present? Imagine if I declined this opportunity saying, "What is that to me? I don't care about other little girls and their cancers." It is only against an implicit notion of global well-being that we can judge my behavior to be less good than it might otherwise be. It is true that no one currently demands that I spend my time seeking, in every instance, to maximize global well-being -- nor do I demand it of myself -- but if global well-being could be maximized, that would be better (by the only definition of "better" that makes any sense).
It seems to me that whatever our preferences and capacities are at present, our beliefs about good and evil must still relate to what is ultimately possible for human beings. We can't think about this deeper reality by focusing on the narrow question of what a person "should" do in the gray areas of life where we spend much of our time. However, the extremes of human experience throw ample light: are the Taliban wrong about morality? Yes. Really wrong? Yes. Can we say so from the perspective of science? Yes. If we know anything at all about human well-being -- and we do -- we know that the Taliban are not leading anyone, including themselves, toward a peak on the moral landscape.
Finally, Blackford asserts, as many have, that abandoning a notion of moral truth "doesn't prevent us developing coherent, rational critiques of various systems of laws or customs or moral rules, or persuading others to adopt our critiques."

In particular, it is quite open to us to condemn traditional systems of morality to the extent that they are harsh or cruel, rather than providing what most of us (quite rationally) want from a moral tradition: for example that it ameliorate suffering, regulate conflict, and provide personal security and social cooperation, yet allow individuals a substantial degree of discretion to live their lives as they wish.

I'm afraid I have seen too much evidence to the contrary to accept Blackford's happy talk on this point. I consistently find that people who hold this view are far less clear-eyed and committed than (I believe) they should be when confronted with moral pathologies -- especially those of other cultures -- precisely because they believe there is no deep sense in which any behavior or system of thought can be considered pathological in the first place. Unless you understand that human health is a domain of genuine truth claims -- however difficult "health" may be to define -- it is impossible to think clearly about disease. I believe the same can be said about morality. And that is why I wrote a book about it...

B R Ambedkar

There was a report in “Asian Age” of 29.4.1999 that quoted Neelalohitadasan Nadar, a minister in Kerala government protesting against the depiction of Narayana Guru as a normal and regular Hindu Sanyasi in appropriating him to Hindutva and RSS Parivar. Even if it is admitted that the Guru through his writings and practices did uphold Hindu values, the concept and contention of the Guru was not of orthodox Hindus. He was a rebel using Hindu scriptures and teachings against all communal and high caste forces. The upper caste Hindus never accepted Narayana Guru as a revered swami nor did they accept the oneness of all religions as propounded by him. These historical facts are completely obliterated in transforming the Guru as a Hindu swami. The same transformation effected in case of Swami Vivekananda as well. The Swami was reduced to an agitator against Muslim and Christian religion and their work of conversion of people to their respective faiths. Almost similar fate awaits Dr. B.R.Ambedkar in the hands of Hindutva protagonists. The Sangha Parivar meticulously researched for quotes from Dr.Ambedkar to demonize the acts of conversions resorted by other religions. The Hindu right writings completely ignored the voluminous writings of Ambedkar against Hindu religion in all its phases. Major parts of Ambedkar’s writings are critiques of Hinduism as such. It was because of such writings the Hindu right led by the RSS in Maharashtra agitated to ban publishing of Ambedkar´s writings. However, there are several parties and groups both political and social practicing and defending him against absorption by Hindu right, while in case of Vivekananda and Narayana Guru there are none. The Ramakrishna Mission as well as the SNDP Yogam is steeped in their tradition and more and the founders intended more evolved into Hindu cults instead of spearheading social revolution for which there. The ruling BJP uses its religious card to take over all the revolutionary social formations advocated by Swami Vivekananda, Narayana Guru and Ambedkar and many more.

K.N.Krishnan.

30.4.1999.       

Geethagovindam.

GEETHAGOVINDAM.                                                                                                  

Geethagovindam also known as Astapadi is sung in temples like Guruvayoor and others on a daily basis. It is a Sanskrit work of medieval period composed of poems and songs.

The author is Jayadeva (12^th CE) an ardent devotee of Krishna an avatar of Vishnu. The legend is that while Jayadeva sung those songs his wife Padmavathi used to dance to the tunes in the temple of Jagannath at Puri, Orissa. The poems are the narrative of the episodes or circumstances of the theme Radha Krishna Lila. The songs are the dialogues of Radha’s companion as well as Radha and Krishna. Before narrating, there is the invocation of god Vishnu in his ten avatars. However, there are two departures from the tradition. First, is omission of Krishna as an avatar and second is including Budha as the ninth avatar inspite of the fact that Budha preached against the Vedic rituals and Brahmanism as such. He in fact instituted a completely separate religion not recognizing any god or gods. This is admitted in the invocation song. There is one about Vishnu as Vamana cheating Bali the grandson of Prahlada both devotees of Vishnu.

The narrative starts with thus: Nanda(gopa) the foster father of Krishna, tells Radha that the sky is full with rain clouds and the forest path is dark with Tamaala trees and he i.e. Krishna is scared of the night and therefore reach him home. Hearing these words both Radha and Krishna left and played love dalliance in each of the grooves of trees along the banks of river Yamuna. This indicates that Radha is much elder to Krishna a boy. There is a legend that says that Radha is a young sister of Nandgopa. Thus, the Radha – Krishna story justifies the love between older women and boys. The narrative might give the idea that the poet will be describing love plays of the couple but that is not so. He follows the conventional rules in portraying Vipralambha (separation in love) and Sambhoga (union in love) Sringara. There is no concept of love, as we understand it nowadays. At the start of his compositions, the author makes it clear that his work is about “Vasudeva’s love plays”. (Sarga 1. Verse 2) And again he mentions two ways to look at his compositions thus: If (you are) too interested in devotion to Hari i.e. God Krishna or enamored in pleasant arts (meaning love plays); then listen to the sweet, beautiful and attractive garland of Jayadeva’s musings. (Sarga 1. Verse 4) He reiterates the same idea at the end in Verse 72.

He starts with the description of the season Vasantha or spring. The season is supposed to induce different sentiments in different groups of people such as couples together and separated. There is pleasant nature facilitating such sentiments.                                                            

The poet introduces Raas-leela in Vrindavan where Krishna is in love play with a large number of young Gopies. From the description, it seems like one Krishna going around hugging, kissing and making love to each one of them. The Gopies are mature to be described having heavy milk bearing breasts in more than one place. The word used is “peena payodhara”. In Sanskrit, it could be explained that way. Jayadeva pictures Raas-leela with one Krishna and many Gopies whereas “Narayaneeyam” describes as many Krishnas as Gopies.

While the raas-leela was going on Radha feels neglected and moves out of the venue in anger and envy. The female companion of Radha describes what is going on and tries to induce her to go back to Krishna. She tells her: “You will be like the lightning in the clouds, when you are on top of Krishna’s body performing Viparita Rati.”   “Vigalitha vasanam, parihrita rasanam ghadaya jaghanam apidhanam.” Meaning thereby “discard the clothes and remove the jingling belt and join your wide open midriff” to Krishna’s body. There are more and more explicit descriptions of love making with different Gopies as well as Radha. One more example is there in Geetam 23, Verse 69. Krishna asks Radha to mount above him and play love. The verse 69 roughly means:

During the emergent love battle, she did something fantastic to be victorious over her lover and due to that performance; her midriff calmed down to rest, her hands loosened their tight grip. Her breasts were heaving and her eyes closed. Surprise; wherefrom women get such manly traits?

However, the text is mainly about Radha and Krishna with Radha’s friend intervening. Why Radha’s friend did not consort with Krishna like all other Gopies is not raised nor answered. There is praise for the God Krishna at every last line of Ashtapadi invoked by the author. There is an invocation at the end of Sarga 11, Verse, 16 in which the author says that Krishna remembered the large heavy breasts of Radha while hitting on the two head mounds on Kamsa’s elephant Kuvalayapida to make it dead. The simile looks a little out of place but the composer is the king in poetry. I found this verse omitted from one publication.

Most of the commentators and translators noted that Jayadeva’s composition is very much erotic in its essence inspite of his invocation to God at every step. But they caution the readers not to be carried away by the erotic descriptions and concentrate their attention on the devotional motive in them. The devotee author used his unfettered freedom in writing the love plays of the God.

Look at a different view. Omit the composition of all words referring to the God and also rename the words Gopies as well as Radha and Krishna. Make a translation of all remaining texts in any language and get branded as an obscene and pornographic writer. That is a reality.

By

K.N.Krishnan.

[

V.Panoli o Adi Sankara

V.Panoli on Adi Sankara.

V.Panoli a multi language scholar and learned in Adi Sankara literatures is reported to have prepared a well researched work on Adi Sankara in English titled “Adi Sankara’s Vision of Reality”. The Matrubhumi weekly carried an adv. for pre-publication orders for the book. Reading about the contents of the book self became curious and ordered one. 31^st March 1999 was the last date and now, it is the end of April 1999 and still there is no announcement as to the date of book publication.

According to the advt. Panoli questions so many long held views on Adi Sankara. He is said to contest the authorship of Bhaja Govindam, Soundarya Lahari and many more works attributed to Adi Sankara. He is also said to have maintained that both Bhakti and Yoga are not part of Adi Sankara’s teachings. V.Panoli is said to deny the widely held view that it was Adi Sankara who propagated a rigid caste society in Kerala making everyone Sudra other than Nambudri Brahmin. Un-touchability and pollution of lower castes were said to have been established by Adi Sankara in Kerala. These views are said to have questioned by Panoli. On the whole, Panoli is said to have advocated a fresh look from un-touchability, Dalits and women towards Adi Sankara’s real views in the light of his Vedanta philosophy. He also says that it will help the Dalits and others to understand that they also are the followers of Vedic religion. Does Panoli view that Vedic religion and today’s Hindutva are two separate entities?

The Matrubhumi publication”Adi Sankara’s Vision Reality” by the renown Sanskrit scholar V. Panoli was received in the afternoon of 1.6.1999. Self completed reading a large part of the book on the same day. In the next two days, I tried to complete it, by selected readings. However, I was unable to understand the real motive behind writing such a book by the scholar. The author in his preface to the book claimed that he wrote this book to dispel certain commonly held understandings on Sankara’s many published works. The author Panoli did not attempt any critical appraisal of the ideas and philosophy propagated in the name of Adi Sankara. Instead, he starts with saying that Adi Sankara is not a mortal man but an appearance of divine miracle that might happen in a Yuga. Adi Sankara  is made out to be an avatar who appeared in the land of Bharata just to write correct commentaries for the Upanishads, Geetha and Brahma Sutra i.e. Prastana Trayee and also to subdue other contemporary philosophical views and systems like Mimamsa, Sankhya, Vaiseshika, Nyaya, Yoga etc. He is also said to have campaigned to expel Buddhist philosophy and practices from the land of Vedas. The author goes on repeating his homilies to Sankara in establishing the supremacy of Advaita philosophy. The claim for the supremacy is said to be Vedas and the divine revelations.

The learned author Panoli claims that his writings on Adi Sankara’s Vision of Reality, were meant to dispel certain interpretations that were said to have entered or inflicted over the original writings of Sankara. The author says that beside the superstitious imaginations and myths about the Acharya, which too have marred the purity of his teachings. These were specifically pointed out in the book but it ended there.

The author has not tried to get into details as those given below:

Most of the philosophical systems and ideas dealt with in Adi Sankara’s ‘authentic works’ were that of northern Indian origin and they were predominant there only. Then why divine took birth in an obscure place in Kerala? Sankara went all the way to the banks of Narmada in Maharashtra to learn all the Vedas etc. from his Guru Govndacharya. The historical truthfulness of this happening is not clear. Does it mean that there were no institutions in Kerala itself to impart Vedic learning to the Brahmins? But there must be some in Tamil Nadu, Andhra or Karnataka. Leaving all these places Sankara traveled all the way to Narmada, at a young age of 12. Who guided him to go all the way in search of this particular Guru? Can it be assumed that at that point of historical time there were collections of Vedic and other literatures in the Ashram of Govindapada on the banks of Narmada? Sankara learned all the Vedic and others in a fast pace. He must be an extra ordinary student to complete not only his Vedic education, Upanishads and Brahma Sutra but also write commentaries i.e. Bhashyas on them within four years i.e. when attained the age of 16. According to this book, Sankara did not write anything there after but went on travelling the length and breath of India, except the present South India. Sankara entered into discussion and dispute with several scholars of the system current at that time. He established his mutts in East, South, West and North; i.e. at Puri in East, Sringeri in South, Dwaraka in West and Kashmir in North respectively. There is not one in his birthplace in Kerala! There are little supporting evidences to all that were attributed to Sankara. It is popularly known that Sankara attained Samadhi at the age of 32, after completing his life mission. It is acclaimed by the author of this book that Advaita advocated by Sankara is a monument to Indian philosophy. At the same time the author deplored the fact India i.e. Bharat deviated from the teachings of the Acharya and continued to follow despicable ways and behavior in their life that are authentic in Vedas and smrities. He has not made any attempt in analyzing the historical context of these revelations. How is that then Adi Sankara is took samdhi so early in life? Did he not know that the people for whose elevation, he appeared in the land has failed to absorb his teachings, specifically his philosophy of Advaita Vedanta as truth? Can it be concluded that Sankara’s teachings were not intelligible not only to the mass of people but also to people who were supposed to teach and guide the masses? If they felt the divine origin and message of Sankara, it is inexplicable as to why they did not continue campaigning and propagating Sankara’s ideas. Just by establishing, the four mutts in four corners of India cannot be considered as revolution in social or even in philosophical sphere. Did any of his mutts tried to attract any one other than the born Brahmins? It will be useful to do some research on the functions of these mutts during their entire history of more than 1,200 years of existence. The author of “Adi Sankara’s Vision of Reality’ himself admits and quotes others in support that theses mutts themselves created and propagated myths about interpolations and attributions to Sankara’s works. Many of them took the freedom to attribute authorship of their own works on Adi Sankara. But all such claims based on certain pre-conceived notions and ideas do not amount to de-mystification when the author is so firm and ready to peddle other myths about Sankara. At one place, the author makes out a case to deny any kind of writing on the part of Sankara where some kind of sex is mentioned. The reasoning and arguments resemble the catholic missionary ideas that he has absorbed as part of his education. One feels sorry for him that he has to explain away Sankara’s commentaries on Brihadaranyaka and Chandokya Upanishads where sexual activity is explicitly explained and sensuality is accepted as normal functions. (It will be good to know that the monumental Brihadaranyaka Bhashyam of scholar sanyasi Nitya Chaitanya Yati, who expired only a few days back omitted the text itself, from his published Bhashyam.) In another work of commentary on Chandokya Upanishad the texts of those mantras dealing sexual acts of pleasure though given but not commented saying that it is the tradition. It all shows a recent mindset conditioned with 18^th century teachings on morality to exclude any thing sexual. All these modern scholar know that in Rigveda there are mantras extolling explicit sexual acts. However, they seemed to feel ashamed to accept them and try to explain away them as allegorical and mystical means. What is that prevents Sankara from following Veda in this subject and why he should be deprived of authorship of such works of poetry? One cannot accept any such exclusion at least in context of ancient Indian thoughts. The anti-sexual and anti-female feelings of many of today’s scholars cannot find support in the ancient texts. Even if some of the works credited to Sankara are kept out, still there are innumerable passages in his works that portray females as obstructing men striving and attaining Jnana or knowledge of self; Atma and Brahma. As the author Panoli maintains; one should not expect contradictory extremes in Sankara and when such contradictions are found, they should be discounted as Sankara’s.

There is the claim that Sankara was expounding the Vedic philosophy of Advaita, but a serious readings of the Vedic texts will show that there are too few mantras dealing with oneness i.e. Advaita in those texts. It is all conjured up commentaries to sustain long preached positions of the Advaities. The most authentic commentary of Sayana did not give that much credence to these claims and followed a common sense method in interpreting Vedic Hymns. The chart provided by Panoli on the sources quoted in the “Prastana Traya” of Sankara is worth telling. While cross quotations from one Upanishad to another Upanishad Bhashyas and other two namely Geetha and Brahma Sutra abound, quotations from Rigveda Samhita are confined to 20 alone. That means that the Acharya mainly depended on cross quotations from Upanishads to develop and sustain his advaita philosophy, Yajur Veda had only 4 and nothing from Sama and Adharva Vedas. Manusmriti is quoted 23 times. Panoli says that there are no quotations from Ramayana, many more of the Puranas not even Kalidasa. Can it not be concluded that Sankara’s acquaintance with works Sanskrit then existing and available, is only limited? That will be a correct one, considering the length of his period of learning being only 4 years. He mastered only one part of the ocean of Sanskrit studies; a smart prodigy he was able to master that part well. He used his learning to win over most of the opposition. He debated and argued with the then scholars of other subjects on the basics of Advaita. V.Panoli cites that there are quotations from 54 earlier works in “Prastana Trayee” Bhashyas of the Acharya. Except for 17 from Jaimini’s Mimamsa, 2 from Nyaya, 2 from Yoga, one from Samkhya, one from Vaiseshika all other quotations are from kindred works supporting Advaita. Why Buddhist, Jaina, Lokayata and others are not mentioned though they were very prevalent at the time? Reason may be limitations of his learning, not the availability of those sources. If he was learned and powerful, the Bhakti and Yoga paths should have been sidelined in his works and only Advaita thoughts and practices to be established as relevant. The later day practitioners of Vedanta mixed up all Bhakti, Yoga and Vedic rituals along with preaching Karma and Jnana. The then rulers did not propagate any Advaita philosophy, but to cater to Bhakti movement and cement it in the minds of masses, constructed the monumental temples. One cannot assume that the movement to build temples was motivated to subdue advaita philosophy but it had that effect in the later years. The heads of Advaita Mutts while mouthing fidelity to advaita practiced and propagated idol worship and various pilgrimages for man’s salvation. . they never left out of dvaita philosophy in the long years of their existence. In fact, all the Hindu orthodoxy found refuge in them.

The author’s dislike of the Smrities in general except that of Manu, is the result of his blind faith in the ideas of Swami Dayananda Saraswati the founder of Arya Samaj in last centuary. Swami’s work “Satyartha Prakash” is not based on a verifiable historical inquiry but blind faith in performing Vedic rituals. Even his interpretation of Vedic literature is not universally accepted because not historical but also due to Christian influence.

While Panoli accepted the Swami’s contention that only Manusmriti is authentic worthwhile, he explained away the so-called interpolations as not desirable. He seems to think that the author of Manusmriti is the fore-father of all earthly creations. What a pathetic understanding of history? But his own idols like Adi Sankara and modern Vivekananda did not ascribe any interpolations as false. One might expect Panoli undertake to edit and publish an authentic text removing all interloping  by imposters with a rigor as was done to Mahabharata by Bhandarkar Institute, Pune. The author mentions approvingly and uncritically a stanza from Balakanda of Ramayana as if there is no other opinion about this part of Ramayana. He also  might have forgotten that ancients themselves considered Uthara Kanda as not belonging to original text. That was the reason for Bhoja to conclude his Champu Ramayanam with Yudhakandam. Today a good number of Sanskrit scholars but not the Pandita Siromanies accept the above.

On his own admission that “the cradle of human race” and “native land of the highest philosophy” i.e. India did not follow those precepts i.e. Advaita and thus down graded itself. He claims that through his writing “Adi Sankara’s Vision of Reality” he is trying to lift up the national and real traditions and correct the perspectives. The claim is simple and silly. He has not come forward with any practical way to restore the past glory of Hinduism. He has not demarcated himself from the “protectors of Hindutva” represented by RSS, BJP, VHP, Bajarag Dal and so many other manifestations of the Parivar. What the author of “Adi Sankara’s Vision of Reality” tried to bring out in the learned dissertation is of limited value. Some of the works attributed to Adi Sankara or those added to originals might be true. It will not make any difference to people reciting Soundarya Lahari and Bhaja Govindam or some other devotional poems whether Adi Sankara or some other Sankara in fact composed them. Panoli’s claim that the Acharya did not accept or approve of Bhakti will never persuade people from following their favorite god worship/ while according to Panoli, the divine avatar who came to establish basic worth of Vedic thoughts and philosophy; in his own admission no such restoration took place during the more than 1,200 years after the Samadhi of the avatar. On the other hand all kinds of myths and superstitions were inaugurated through many more smrities and Puranas. There is some similarity with Tantric and Yogic practices as well.

Then also according to Panoli, no one was as scholarly as Sankara until the appearance of Swami Dayananda Saraswati a Gujarati Brahmin by origin in the second half of 19^th century. We were supposed to believe such a claim even though there were good lots of writings in all faculties in Sanskrit were created and propagated in the land. This happened while the land was more or less under Muslim rule. Panoli’s claims belittle the contributions of Ramanuja, Madhva, Vallabha, Nimbarka, Sayana, Madhava and many others whose names are legends. In his book, Panoli did not mention works other than that of Dayananda Saraswati. May be, in his opinion they were less learned than the Swami. This kind of extreme positions taken by Panoli is negative.               

Matrubhumi of 6.6.1999 carried an article by learned historian Dr. N.V.P.Unithiri in reply to an earlier article by Vasudeva Bhattathiri extolling the ancient Sruti/Smriti Puranas for advocating good only for men against women and Sudras. According to Bhattathiri, people of modern times did not understand the meanings of Sruti/Smriti Puranas and because of that, meanings of teachings of those ancients are not truthfully reported. He specifically dealt the subject of Sudras and women to learn Vedas. During the argument, Bhattathiri relied on selected quotations and half verses. He also attributed his own meaning to them. These included certain portions of Apasudradhikaranam from Brahma Sutra and its Sankara Bhashya.

The writer of Adi Sankara’s Vision of Reality, V. Panoli on the other hand maintains that the portions of Apasudradhikaranam in Brahma Sutra as well as its Bhashya by Sankara, both are spurious interpolations. The historian Dr. Unithiri, questioned Bhattathiri quoting relevant verses from Smrities and Bhashyas including Apasudradhikaranam. The historian is of the view that whatever meaning Bhattathiri finds in those quotations the fact is that no woman is free in life, she has to always under some male protection. Similarly Sudra by his birth, a low caste and he cannot become a learned as with higher caste born.

It is ironical to find a learned scholar like Panoli, to write a small tome, at this end years of 20^th century, just to explain and establish that sacred works attributed to Adi Sankara are myths and interpolations and or complete fabrications. Ofcourse the Sanatani Hindu society evolved in the last two millennia, has accepted, absorbed and practiced certain rituals, rites and behaviors as god given, whether they actually had any scriptural base and support. Ironically, this includes the common understanding about Sankara. Unless motivated by efforts in bringing social and religious reforms, writing such long tracts has no point at all. Dayananda established Arya Samaj to meet the needs of modern times, as he understood. He tried to reform Hindu religion based on his interpretations of ancient texts, although those same texts were subjects of interpretations by so many of the scholars in historical times. Dayananda opened a new path in understanding the ancient texts. One may agree with him or may not, but his efforts resulted in forming one more group in the society. The other reformer was Vivekananda and his followers. They tried for a compromise between the ancient and modern while not making a fetish of ancients. They got more influence outside India than inside. The same fate fell upon Arabindo as well. Scholars and others not wanting in quoting sayings from Vivekananda when they want to impress and buttress their arguments. There are still less who quote Arabindo and still less who refer to Dayananda and his writings. However, none of their teachings, writings or practices did create any significant change in the rites, rituals and practices of the mass of people called Hindus.

A good lot of Keraleeya scholars had been writing about on the ancient literatures including philosophical mainly Advaita. They have never even thought of the Buddhist, Jaina literatures available in abundance. For instance, the writings of the earliest authors/scholars like Kodungallur Kunjikutan Thamburan, Vadakumkoor Rajaraja Varma Raja, Ulloor Parameswara Iyer, Vallathol Narayana Menon, Kuttikrishna Marar etc. in their writings dealing on Indian philosophical traditions did not go into any other than Hindu. They discussed and explained Vedas and Upanishads of Sankara’s Advaita philosophy, never venturing or even mentioning pre-Sankara developments in philosophies. May be the Buddhist and Jaina literatures were in languages other than Sanskrit. However, there are many Sanskrit works that of Nagarjuna, Dingnaga and more. Even these available literatures were kept out of their purview and making it seem that Sankara’s Advaita is something unique and original. It should fill the Keraleeya hearts with pride. Such scholarship on the part of Keraleeya pandits did create a halo and divinity on Sankara. That the tradition that he is the source all things in Kerala nay Hindu traditions of the whole of India, kept people and scholars of Kerala origin out of other traditions.                     

True to this historical background the author of Adi Sankara’s Vision of Reality, extols Sankara not as a human being but as a divine avatar. Avatar of which God? May be Shiva since his guru Govindacharya is recognised as such i.e. Sankara of Kailasa, on his first meeting with his pupil. But Sankara himself did not approve or recognise Shiva as the source of universe. At least Panoli argues for such a case in his book. Was Sankara is an avatar of Vishnu? Might be, since he composed a great Bhashya on Bhagavad Gita as being a saying of Krishna an avatar of Vishnu. This was not approved by Panoli. Still he maintained Sankara as divine avatar who appeared in this world to reclaim Vedic teaching and traditions. But what is the significance of his birth in Kerala about which he never mentioned anything n his writings? There is also no reasonable explanation for a Kerala Brahmin of 8^th century to go all the way to north upto Kashmir and Kedarnath to preach and propagate his philosophy but not in South India. Was it because in his time, Sankara found south India following the true Vedic tradition and the north forsaking the same? Or will it be correct to say that Buddhist and Jaina were strong in north thereby he worked there. But a number of Buddhist scholars belonged to south who wrote Buddhist treatises in Sanskrit, prior to Sankara. Except in Kashmir, there were very few Buddhist scholars in north. Most probably, the Vishnu, Krishna and such personalized cults were wide spread there such as in Punjab, Rajasthan, UP, Bengal and Orissa. But Sankara did not target these personalized cults in his works. His targets were those who proclaimed their affinity to Sankhya, Mimamsa, Nyaya, Vaiseshika like group of philosophers. Occasionally, the Vijnana Vadin and Sunya Vadin of Mahayana Buddhism. Contrary to claims, Sankara followed the ideas of Buddhism by making certain additions and alterations in the then Buddhist philosophies. Several scholars accused him of being ‘Prachhanna Budha’ in those times. V.Panoli did not go deep into these in asserting that Sankara never barrowed any idea from outside of Vedic. In proof of his contention, he depends on “Sankara Vijayam” a biography of Sankara by another divine Swami Vidyaranya. There are many more “Sankara Vijayams in vogue in this country, mystifying the birth, workings, writings and death of Sankara. None of those could be relied to tell the truth of Sankara’s life. 

Two matters did not find full mention in Panoli’s book. One is about the so-called “Sankara Smriti” that is popularly claimed as codified rules of conduct to all castes in Kerala. I have not seen any published copy of this Smriti, but read in books and articles where the same is discussed. The report is that there are many versions of this work in circulation in Kerala and outside. It is said that matriarchy is imposed in Kerala to all castes except the Brahmins i.e. Nambudries.

The second is the claimed biography of Adi Sankara in circulation in several versions. No one so far proved the authenticity any one of them. They are full of stories of divine miracles performed by Sankara during his short life in this world. Panoli cited only one of them as stated earlier. According to my readings, some others claimed authenticity and sanctity to one “Sankara Dig Vijayam” certified by the Sringeri Sankaracharya as authentic. But this also propagates the same or similar myths and miracles as in other versions.

Some of them are downright absurd and farcical. Look at the following story cited by some ardent devotees of Sankara.
 Adi Sankara was challenged to a debate by Mandana Misra, a learned and well-known Purva Mimamsa scholar.  They agreed that Mandana’s wife, Ubhaya-Bharati, a renowned scholar in her own right, would be the referee and that the loser of the debate would become the disciple of the winner.  After debating for many days, Mandana Misra lost and was about to become the disciple of Adi Sankara.  However, Ubhaya-Bharati then challenged Adi Sankara to debate her, on the grounds that since she and her husband were one person upon being married, he would have to defeat both of them in order to win the debate.
 Adi Sankara accepted her challenge.  The debate went well for Adi Sankara until Ubhaya-Bharati began posing intricate questions on the science of erotica (well accepted, in the appropriate context, as a topic of sacred discourse and knowledge in Hinduism).  If it was “considered unseemly” per traditional Hinduism for women to talk about sex. (Adi Sankara ended up satisfactorily answering the questions on eroticism and Ubhaya-Bharati accepted her defeat.) How?

Sankara took a few weeks leave to continue the debate. As a young sanyasi, he was not initiated anything in sexual mores. They were known only to the married. Therefore, Sankara performed a miracle. One of the kings in a kingdom died (no cause is given in the story). It meant that the soul left the body. Sankara knew about this and using his divine power moved his soul out of his own body and entered the body of the dead king. Queens and relatives rejoiced at the king coming alive. (We have no idea about the age of the dead king. Must be young.) Sankara with the king’s body indulged in all sorts of sexual acts and thus learned the essence of eroticism and sex.   

There is more than one question rising out of this miracle episode in the life of Sankara. Although it was claimed that Sankara mastered all knowledge available at his time, was he not aware of the Kama sutra of Vatsayana much earlier to him? Kama sutra explained elaborately on all aspects of sexualities. Any one could have benefited from it without going through real experience in sexual activities. But that is what Sankara is said to have adopted. Before entering the dead body of the king, he had no knowledge as to what the king used to with his queens. How did he act with them? Since he had no idea of sex, as he was an ascetic, maintaining celibacy the behavior with the queens should have been strange.  In turn, the queens would have sensed it and wondered about the dead king coming to life. Even today, faithful are scared of ghosts possessing people and then behaving strange. At those long past era not only the queens but also everyone else in the court would have taken the king as a ghost.

What is the moral sanctity on the part of Sankara to disguise as the king? Was it not cheating and appropriating other’s identity? His performance of sex with the queens might be considered as a kind of rape, even in those times. Devotees did not envisage their telling of miracle by Sankara kindle these quarries and they need to be answered.

K.N.Krishnan.

June/July 1999.

Parameswaran History

Matrubhumi Weekly   (Malayalam) of 17-24 April 1999, carried an article said to be in response to an earlier article by writer Anand. This response is from a RSS “intellectual”. The article starts with saying that intellectuals (may be other than of RSS brand) get into a mess through their one sided thinking. Mr. P.Parameswaran is a well-known RSS scribe not known as a scholar in any branch of knowledge faculty. According to this scribe, the history of Indian National Struggle for Independence from British rule is that of Hindus alone. In his support, he wanted some of the extremists in the movement to be described, recognised and accepted as fore most fighters in behalf of Hindu. He makes a claim that the extremist past of the national movement to be taken back to the time of Pazhassi Raja and Veluthambi Dalawa. Here he conveniently omits to mention another contemporary Tipu Sultan who went down fighting the British domination. May be Tipu’s fight was not against British at all. This is a new reading of history that Pazhassi Raja and Veluthambi were fighting for Hindutva against British. Such reading of history is stock in trade with north Indian Hindutva historians. According to their reading both Swami Vivekananda and Maharshi Arabindo were Hindutva protagonists. They were advising and guiding the then extremists in Bengal. Today the Hindutva historian has appropriated all but few top national leaders for fighting for Hindutva. Really, there were few who spoke of Hindu past but never asked or worked for that. They all fought for a modern India. They have tried to appropriate the Mahatma himself to their side for his preaching Ram Rajya all his life. The Mahatma has clarified his position in every time that his Ram Rajya is not a Hindu Rajya but a regime of justice to all communities. The Hindu historian has done it in case of Dr. Ambedkar as well. Dr. Ambedkar in his days criticized and ridiculed Hinduism in his writings. While writing on the idea of Pakistan, Ambedkar raised a number of facts connected with Muslim rule in India from the past. It was part of his criticism of all kinds of fanatic ideologies being propagated in the name of nationalism. This Hindutva ideologue selected only those that are in tune with his own depiction of Muslim rule. The Hindutva vadi in him makes Parameswaran to claim that polytheism is a virtue in Hindu religion for every male god there is a female as well. This justifies the claim that in Hinduism there is sexual equality much the same way as in the present day feminist demand. He also claims that keeping in with the current socio-political developments and also to cultivate allies; Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism and other smaller sects. He says that all these are not separate but  branches of Hinduism itself. He will surely will not admit that at one point of time both Buddhism and Jainism were predominant in all over India. But both disappeared from such a position for convincing reasons still to be ascertained. Dr. Ambedkar re-asserted Buddhism as more progressive to Hinduism but not accepted by the communal forces. The Hindutva group organised violent protests against naming the Nagpur University as Dr. Ambedkar University. Though the RSS itself may not be directly responsible, its associated outfits were leading the agitation.

When Parameswaran speaks of birth and fate of Arya Samajists and Hindu Mahasabhaists one might assume that the current RSS and its Parivar also may disappear from the main scene in a future date.

Parameswaran accepts with one condition that freedom of expression does not include freedom to convert from one religion to another. The arguments against conversion are that others i.e. the Semitics wanted to bring their uniformed thought and faith not allowing any dissent. He quotes from a Semitic source book. The logic is less convincing in the light of claims for superiority to Hinduism.

One would like to take note of and underline the explanations for Hindu gods keep more than one weapon in their hands, is to fight evil. Parameswaran says that there is no non-violent Hinduism. According to him, the Hindutva forces are for polytheism including all female gods, which he agrees to be paganism and pre-historic one. But let us look at the actual practice. The Hindus at least among the higher castes never accepted the SC/ST as part of Chaturvarna. They are branded as Panjama, the fifth caste not part of Hinduism. They are still kept as un-touchable in their homes and villages. Even the high castes do not allow any freedom for their women. Widows are not to be seen when one starts a journey from home. They are evil omen. Whoever fought against such practices were denounced as infidel. Polytheism itself is a sort of compromise on the part Brahmin authority; with different castes but not with Panjama. Otherwise, the authority of ones own god was the norm. Shiva for Shaivaites and Vishnu for Vaishnavas etc. it is only very late in history, rivalries between gods subsided and mutual admission was put in to practice. Even then, there were pagan gods not accepted in Hindu pantheon. Only recently the efforts at Hinduising pagan gods taken up by Sangha Parivar as part of Hinduising the Dalits and tribals.

Another point that the writer was making out is that the early freedom fighters were Hindus and they naturally adopted violence in their fight against imperialism. He cites Chaphekar brothers of Maharashtra to support his contention. The brothers wanted to establish a Hindu Rajya in India. He also maintained that by excluding Hindu extremists from the pantheon of freedom fighters, the post freedom governments were family forums, without explicitly naming Nehru family. He keeps hidden the fact the whole families of Nehru were eminent freedom fighters on their own and not depended on the family line. This includes Indira, Rajiv and today Sonia. All of them fought elections and got elected in spite of the denigrating propaganda against them. The communal elements did not get any representations for many years until the frenzy of Mandal commission verdict dividing people on different caste basis. The Vajapeyee government came to power in alliance with regional and caste based parties.

Parameswaran seems to think that while fight for freedom was that of Hindus the fruits of freedom i.e. political authority went to secularists, Christian and western minded. He has not yet made a charge that the Indian National Congress was not fighting for freedom but manipulating the fight for freedom carried by Hindutva.

According to him, nationalism in India is Hindu nationalism and is deferent from that of west. Such nonsense is talked about only to defend the RSS ideology. There are several studies that found and recognized the worst parts of Semitic religions that were adopted and internalized by the Hindu fundamentalists in their ideology and practice while mouthing spiritual thoughts of Vedantin.

One thing was clear from Parameswaran’s diatribe that given a chance, they will paint freedom struggle fought under the leadership of Indian National Congress, a combined force of all major and minor communities in India, with a saffron brush and make only Hindus as real heroes. In the process, Sardar Patel and many other original leaders of earliest struggles will be assimilated as Hindu fighters. As said earlier even Mahatma is being grafted to their side. Parameswaran is hinting at the possibility of Indira and Rajiv as well. The point made by him that there is an underlying Hindu nationalism based on oneness of Hindu society from pre-historic times; is not shared by other intelligent people. He claims that RSS like Hindu organisations are making efforts to recapture or revive that elusive Hindu nationalism, a solid rock designed in past history. The Muslim intelligentsia who at the beginning of Indian national movement demarcated themselves from Hindu in various ways finally culminated in the demand for separate country Pakistan for Muslims. Parameswaran is silent or hiding all other developments and asserts a one sided Hindu nationhood. This may in future make way for further division of the country based on region and caste majority.                          

It will be interesting to see any follow up of these arguments in the future issues of the magazine.

About a week earlier, Matrubhumi weekly carried another article by the same Parameswaran RSS ideologue. He critically viewed the works of non-Hindutva historians writing history of Kerala. He gleefully quoted some eminent historians saying further that Marxist approach in writing history of Kerala was a failure. Marxist method is not applicable to Kerala. The RSS man was advocating an alternative approach that is national and one with traditions. He identified that the current approach to history is the result of western influences in effect Christian one. According to this gentleman Marxism and secularism are the outgrowth of Christian and therefore not suitable to us in India and Kerala. But he failed to point out any tradition of keeping historical records in this land, much less about writing history of their own times. He in fact may be advocating concoction of a national Hindu history, as he understands the tradition. What is the national Hindu tradition in writing history? Can we formulate an accurate history from the available sources on our ancient literature, philosophy, Ayurveda etc.?

We have no records of any one of the Vedic heroes and composers except the legends. May be according to the BJP ideologue, we must learn history through Vedic and Upanishad stories, myths and Puranas and several Sankara Vijayams, Sthalapuranas connected with temples and pilgrim sites or pure hearsays. These will give our history unique and inimitable greatness as special Hindu race destined to lead the world in all aspects material and spiritual. The Hindutva super race is inventing history not just for us but also for the whole world.

(Somewhere I read that Ketumalam, one of the seven dvipas mentioned on Puranas, is the same Guatemala in Latin Americas. In another place, some revered Shastri is said to have advised the Brahmins residing in America to specify in their Sankalpa, Crouncha Dvipa in place of Jambu Dvipa where India is situated. By the way, Crouncha Dvipa is supposed to be surrounded by milky ocean.)

Some of these like Parameswaran, maintained and continue to do so that all of mankind are originally Hindu, later converted to Judaism, Christianity and Islam etc. etc. Only in India, such mass conversions did not take place. The India or Bharat remains Hindu. Parameswaran did not voice his views on these. May be that he kept them in reserve for the real Hindu history to be prepared in due course of time. In his earlier article, he attributed to Christian, naming certain Hindu rites and traditions as pagan. He did not give his own view about what is really paganism and not forming part of Hindu tradition. There are groups called pagan in many places, in Africa, remote parts of other continents as well as in many islands in Pacific.   

K.N.Krishnan.

June/July, 1999.